Ever since Socrates interrogated his fellow citizens, philosophers have been troubled by the apparently paradoxical phenomenon of weakness of will, i.e. of people failing to do that which they allegedly believe they ought to do. Many thinkers have felt that if A believes that he ought to do X in situation Y, then when presented with situation Y, A will do X and should he fail to do so, this reveals that A really does not believe that he ought to do X in situation Y. Various objections have been offered to this posi tion, one of the most important being the inability of those denying the existence of moral weakness to explain the remorse or regret which we feel for having not acted in accordance with our professed moral beliefs.
In a recent article^-Professor C, Grant Luckhardt has attempted to show why those who deny that there is weakness of will need not be troubled by the phenomenon of remorse or regret. He does this by arguing (1) that con temporary formulations of the Socratic "To know the good is to do the good" principle are unacceptable and must be qualified and (2) that onee the So cratic principle is properly qualified remorse and regret will not consti tute evidence against the truth of the Socratic principle. In this response I will show (1) that Professor Luckhardt's proposed qualifications of the Socratic principle are unnecessary and that if we merely understand what the original principle asserts, then it is clear that the unqualified prin ciple is not subject to the two sorts of difficulties that Luckhardt raises and (2) that even if the Socratic principle is modified in the proposed manner, it is still unable to answer the remorse/regret objection. Turning to Luckhardt's second sort of objection, no one would deny that people who believe that they ought to do X might fail to do X through in ability. However, contrary to Professor Luckhardt, such failures do not show that these people violated their professed moral beliefs. Luckhardt has simply forgotten that a person can only be morally obligated to do that which he can do. Should a blizzard make travel on Monday impossible, I am no longer obligated to return the money on Monday. I may have been morally obligated to anticipate and prepare for this contingency and I may have failed to fulfill that obligation. However this does not mean that my inability to act does not release me from my original moral obligation. Simply by recog nizing that "X ought to do Y" entails that "X can do Y" enables us to ade-5 Lukes, Steven "Moral Weakness" Philosophical Quarterly XV (1965) p. 106. 6 Luckhardt, p. 162. The underlined words are Luckhardt's two qualifications the underlining of the phrase "at the time he failed to act that he ought to act" has been added.
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In the discussion that follows I will refer to R. M. Hare's version of the Socratic principle. However my response can be applied, mutâtis mutandis, to the formulations of Gardiner and Lukes.
quately defend any of the modern formulations of the Socratic principle against Luckhardt's second group of objections.
In reply to my criticisms, Professor Luckhardt might respond by claiming either (a) that his proposed qualifications merely provide certain normally assumed but unstated modifications of the Socratic principle or (b) that his proposed qualifications do not really alter the principle but rather merely explicitly state that which is already implicit in the original principle. However, on the one hand, rejoinder (a) fails because, as I have argued, Luckhardt's 'qualifications' do not in any way alter the initial principle. It is as if someone were to object to a geometrical theorem about triangles on the ground that the theorem did not explicitly state that a triangle was a three-sided plane figure. On the other hand, Luckhardt cannot make reply (b) save on pain of contradicting his initial claim that the unqualified versions of the Socratic principle "... are patently false".7 There is sure ly a great difference between saying that a certain principle is patently false and saying that a certain principle is true but in need of further exposition lest it be misunderstood. Thus neither response will save Luck hardt's analysis from my objection. 
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itary academy and Chen graduated from West Point first in his class. He has bravely fought in three wars. He steadfastly believes in all of the military virtues. However, in a certain battle, Jones* entire regiment is killed and he himself is badly wounded and in great pain. The enemy charges and in spite of all of his previous training and behavior Jones runs away. Jones survives, fights bravely in many other battles, but always feels remorse for having once acted in a manner contrary to his moral beliefs. Doesn't it seem implaus ible to say that in every case of this type the person for one day ceased be lieving that which he believed the rest of his life? Case Two: Natasha is a dedicated, thoroughly committed Communist. Her parents and grandparents have been lifelong party members. She can recite all of the Marxist classics from memory. Before joining the party, she belonged to the Young Pioneers and the Young Communist League. She has self-sacrifingly vol unteered for five years on a collective farm in Siberia. While on a special mission abroad to sell the crown jewels in order to provide money for famine relief, she falls in love with a capitalist. Throughout their relationship she continues to espouse her Communist beliefs, hates her lover for his re actionary views, but still finds him the most attractive person whom she has ever known. In spite of her years in the movement and her commitment to the cause, out of her love she betrays her beliefs by giving the crown jewels to her lover. Feeling remorse for having acted in a manner contrary to her moral beliefs, she returns to Russia, confesses her crime, is sentenced to Siberia, and for the rest of her life she declares her punishment to be just. Isn't it far easier to say that Natasha, because of her emotional state, acted con trary to her moral beliefs than to say that she ever abandoned her belief in Communism?
My reason for introducing these two cases is that in his paper Professor Luckhardt only discusses cases which readily lend themselves to a defense of the Socratic principle and neglects those very cases which lead people to think that the principle is false. I agree with Luckhardt that in the cases he cites, such as that of a man who calmly decides not to return a bag of money aijd that of a professor who calmly decides not to attend a faculty meeting, the evidence clearly indicates that these people are following their real rather than their professed moral beliefs. However it is not cases such as these which cause the Socratic difficulties but rather cases such as those I have just offered where one's emotional state is at fever pitch and one does not do what one normally would do.
What would a Socratic say of such cases? In each case the person definitely seems to believe that he or she ought to do something which he or she does not do and the remorse which they later profess to feel is for having acted in a manner contrary to their moral beliefs. Though not every case of remorse or regret involves a person feeling remorse or regret for having acted in a manner contrary to their moral beliefs, any adequate account of that for which X feels remorse at time t2 is going to have to allow for the fact that at least occasionally that for which X feels remorse is X's not having acted at time t^ on X's time t]_ moral belief. It is this inability to ever explain remorse or regret in terms of a failure to have acted on a previous moral belief that is the crux of the remorse/regret objection to the Socratic prin ciple and nothing in Professor Luckhardt's paper answers it. E-10
